Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corp.

 

Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corp.

G.R. No. 215118

June 19, 2019

FACTS:

                The RTC and CA convicted Maria Nympha Mandagan for the crime of violation of BP 22. On July 28, 2001, JMV Corporation, represented by its executive officer, Ramon Ricardo V. Gutierrez, the son of RVG, entered into a lease-to-own arrangement with BPI Leasing Corporation (BPI) covering a 2001 Kia Rio sedan. Under the lease-to-own arrangement, BPI Leasing Corporation will remain the registered owner of the vehicle until full payment by JMV Corporation. Earlier, on July 11, 2001, JMV paid the down payment of Php87,922, guarantee deposit of Php3,078, initial rental of Php2,796 and notarial fee of Php200. Likewise, on July 28, 2001, JMV gave the possession and use of the Kia vehicle to accused Maria Nympha Mandagan (Mandagan), who in tum, issued and delivered to JMV thirty four (34) postdated checks against her bank account (Equitable-PC!). Said checks were all payable to JMV representing Mandagan's monthly payment of P12,796. In addition, Mandagan explicitly agreed that ownership over the Kia vehicle will only be transferred to her after full payment of the costs of the vehicle to JMV. Fourteen (14) out of the thirty (34) checks in the amount of Php12,796 each totaling to Phpl 79,144.00 were deposited by JMV with BPI and were honored by the bank. However, the following eleven (11) checks, when deposited on their respective due dates were dishonored for reason drawn against insufficient funds or account closed. BPI advised Ms. Marcelina Balmeo, JMV's Treasury Head, every time the checks were dishonored, who in turn immediately communicated the dishonor of said checks to Mandagan and demanded for payment which were all unheeded by Mandagan. JMV's General Account Supervisor, Ms. Rosemarie Edora, also started communicating with Mandagan sometime in April 2003, repeatedly informing the latter of the dishonored checks and reminding her of her outstanding obligations with JMV. Mandagan responded by requesting for photocopies of the dishonored checks and gave assurance that she would replace them with new ones and even promised that she will immediately settle her obligations with JMV by one-time payment, after she acknowledged receipt of her requested photocopies of the dishonored checks. Meanwhile, all the checks issued by JMV to BPI as payment for its monthly amortization of the Kia vehicle were all honored. On June 30, 2003, JMV's counsel demanded from Mandagan the payment of the 11 checks that were dishonored plus 12.75% or to return the Kia vehicle, plus the amount of Phpl 19,434.67 to cover depreciation costs. Mandagan was given 5 days to comply with the demands of JMV. This was unheeded, however. Thus JMV was constrained to institute the corresponding legal action against Mandagan. After preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila found probable cause against Mandagan for 8 counts of Violation of B.P. 22 and filed the corresponding informations before the MTC of Manila. Charges representing the 3 other checks were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA committed reversible error

HELD:

                Yes. In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and unappealable. Such rule proceeds from the accused's constitutionally-enshrined right against prosecution if the same would place him under double jeopardy.  Thus, a judgment in such cases, once rendered, may no longer be recalled for correction or amendment - regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or the proceedings before the CA were a mockery such that Ando's acquittal was a foregone conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or appreciation of evidence that the CA may have committed in ordering Ando's acquittal, absent any showing that the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due process, the CA's findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating the rule against double jeopardy. A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution. Admissions made by the accused in the pleadings submitted in the same case do not require further proof, especially so when such admission is categorical and definite. However, it will be noted that the accused executed the counter affidavit at a time when the private complainant has already filed the complaint for violation of B.P. 22 against her. It is unclear whether the accused came to know of the demand letter before the filing of the complaint against her. By all indications, she may have known about the demand letter when she received the copy of the complaint-affidavit and its annexes from the private complainant. In order to hold liable the accused for violation of BP 22, it is necessary that the notice of dishonor or demand letter must be served upon the accused before the filing of the complaint. Precisely, the purpose of the notice of dishonor is to give opportunity to the accused to pay the amount of the bouncing checks to avert criminal prosecution. If such admission was made after the filing of the complaint, any admission made by the accused in the pleadings without any referral as to the time when she received the demand letter would not prejudice her. To be admissible against the accused, the admission made must be categorical and definite. Likewise, reminders or oral demands are not sufficient to bind the accused. The notice of dishonor or demand must be in writing as required under Sec. 3 of B.P. 22. Under the circumstances, therefore, the accused may not be convicted for violation of B.P. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of said crime. The evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt absent any showing that the lawyer's letter of demand was sent to the accused and actually received by her. There is no evidence presented against the accused to prove the receipt of the demand letter other than the alleged admissions made during the preliminary conference and in her counter affidavit.