Digital Paradise, Inc. v. Casimiro

 

Digital Paradise, Inc. v. Casimiro

G.R. No. 209608

February 13, 2019

FACTS:

                Digital Paradise, Inc. is engaged in electronics business. The respondents drove a Kia L300 van and a Toyota Hi-Ace van to CHKS complex wherein they forced open a padlock to a unit DPI is leasing. They brought inside the unit boxes which they opened and took several items DPI owns. They left the complex and after 30 min. they went back to take a picture of the unit. After 1 hour, the Barangay Councilor, Chairman of Peace and Order of Brgy. Ugong and his team arrived. However the policemen were not there anymore. DPI filed against them two counts of Robbery with Force Upon Things, Incriminating Innocent Persons, two counts of Other Forms of Trespass, and Grave Coercion, all under the RPC. Also violations of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standard for Public Officials and Employees as well as Section 3(e) RA No. 3019. According to the respondents, they were informed by an informant that electronics were hijacked from Amkor Tech Phil., Inc. that such items were loaded on two vans. The vans were set to go to the compound of Giant Building. The respondents conducted surveillance in that area and hailed the vans. As the police explained the driver’s violation of Seatbelt Law, one alighted and ran away towards the compound. When the police asked the contents of the boxes and learned that the items contained therein were Amkor’s, the driver was informed of his right and his other companion also ran but was eventually arrested as well as the one who first ran away. Later on, Bistal said that he was the one who supervised the shipment ordered by his bosses “Rebecca” and “Cris” but was also arrested. The Ombudsman dismissed the case against respondents for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

                No. The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion is an independent action. Its use is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The Ombudsman is the protector of the people. The Court opines that there is merit in the Ombudsman's assessment that the pieces of evidence presented by DPI were insufficient to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion. DPI heavily relied on Manese’s affidavit. The respondents' entry inside the subject warehouse and the command to Manese and Seciban for them to lie down on the ground are still very much consistent with the presumption of regularity in the performance of the respondents' official duties as police officers. DPI utterly failed to show that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondents. Instead, the instant petition is bereft of any statement or allegation purportedly showing that the Ombudsman exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Since DPI failed to exhibit even a tinge of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, the assailed Joint Resolution and Joint Order must be upheld, and the instant petition must be dismissed.